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A SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
ACCUMULATION FOR LONG WAVE
UPSWING IN AUSTRALIA?
Phillip Anthony O'Hara
In recent years there has been a tendency in the popular press, in political
debate and in some scholarly papers to talk of an 'Australian economic
miracle' or 'the booming Australian economy'. So common are these
recitations that they have become embedded in the popular conscience.
Some contributors to this special issue of the Journal of Australian
Political Economy implicitly endorse this view of a 'miracle economy';
often using GDP growth rather than GDP per capita growth as the
crucial proxy. Much is made of the contribution of changes in policy,
renewed enterprise, and the "resources boom" to this apparently buoyant
state of affairs. In this light, it is encouraging to see some scholars
critically evaluating these pronouncements of a "boom". Tom Bramble
(2004), for instance, in an earlier article from this journal, rightly seeks to
balance the debate by discussing some of the major contradictory
processes impinging on this so-called mimcle economy. Special
emphasis is given to the contradictions of labour force polarisation,
lacklustre performance of the global economy, household debt and
potential speculative collapse, external account problems, plus
ideological contradictions.
This current article also seeks to demystify this "miraculous and
booming economy", through an empirico-institutional analysis of the
long-term performance of the Austmlian economy within a global
setting. Special reference is given to whether Australia has been going
through long wave upswing or downswing over recent decades, and
whether suitable social structures of accumulation are currently in place
to propel sustainable growth in the long-term. The article has three main
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sections. The first sets out the basic theory underlying social structures of
accumulation. Next the contours of Australia's institutional structure and
dynamics are discussed, especially as they relate to the process of capital
accumulation, capital-labour relations, capital-state interactions and
industry-finance linkages. The third section examines in some detail the
main performance measures over the past few decades, set in a broader
historical context of long-term motion. Indicators such as per capita
growth, productivity, investment and rate of profit are examined; as well
as broader measures such as trust and genuine progress. The conclusion
summarises and outlines the likely prognosis of SSA-Iong wave motion
into the future.
Social Structure of Accumulation Theory
Social structure of accumulation (SSA) theory posits three main
propositions. I The first is that long-term socioeconomic performance
under capitalism is affected by institutions - those durable structures,
outside the direct control of individual firms, which condition the process
of capital accumulation, relationships between industrial and financial
capitals, capital and labor, capital and the state, and nation-state set
within the global economy. Long term investment, demand and growth
are affected by levels of confidence, stability, conflict resolution and
coordination of activities. These public goods fundamentally condition
the rate of long-term performance. For this reason we outline the
dominant institutional clusters and relationships impacting on Australia's
long-term performance.
The second hypothesis is that SSAs undergo evolutionary transformation
through historical time, as the institutions develop, reproduce, mature
The SSA approach started with the work of David M. Gordon (1978, 1980),
followed by the collective work of Gordon, Bowles and Weisskopf; (see Bowles
1990); Gordon, Edwards and Reich (1982); and then many other studies by writers
such as David Kotz, Terrence McDonough, Victor Lippit, Phillip O'Hara and
Martin Wolfson. (See McDonough el a/ 2006 and O'Hara 2006a for recent work.)
This current work is the first published paper relating SSAs specifically to the
contemporary Australia scene. For links between SSA theory and other innovative
elements of contemporary political economy see O'Hara (2007a, 2007b).
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and decline; and then potentially undergo transformation and renewal.
Institutional clusters are thus subject to change and metamorphosis as
their potential to generate system-functions propelling long-term growth
evolves through time. It is critical to emphasise that SSA theory posits no
deterministic forms of change, such as rigid periodicities or amplitudes,
but simply that durable institutional structures undergo metamorphosis
through long movements ("waves") of dynamic formation and demise.
Following this historical pattern of change is the critical thing for SSA
empirics, as path-dependent processes impact on the political economy.
Thirdly, SSA theory differentiates between high, medium and low rates
of per capita GDP growth, as well as between GDP and broader
socioeconomic variables. It seeks to critically evaluate the performance
of capitalist economies according to whether they are undergoing long
wave upswing (above 2.5 percent GDP growth per capita over at least 15
years); mixed results (between 2.01 and 2.5 percent growth per capita);
and long wave downswing (below 2.01 percent growth per capita). SSA
empirics link GDP to investment, productivity and profit rate; as well as
broader social and environmental patterns of change.
Institutional Dynamics of the Australian Political
Economy
We need now to identify the dominant institutions of the Australian
political economy as it relates to accumulation and growth. There are
five major planks of the Australian institutional environment, relevant to
long-term socioeconomic conditions. These planks include (a) a belief in
relatively small government, (b) a deregulated financial system, (c) a
deregulated labour market, (d) free trade and openness to international
capital, (e) a neo-conservative coalition of the willing, and (f) neoliberal
development philosophy. .
First, there is a belief in small government. The neoliberal consensus
posits the need to reduce the size of government to a far smaller
percentage of GDP than was typical in the postwar era of the 1960s and
early 1970s. It seeks to privatize government enterprises, reduce red tape,
and increase corporate self-governance. One justification for this is that
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ACCUMULATION 91
governance functions can be perfonned by other institutions such as
corporations, non-government organizations, and communities. A second
justification is the belief that there has been too much governance,
especially during the 1960s and early to mid 1970s, and that a decline in
quasi-public goods is in order.2
Australia has joined the global trend of selling off public corporations
such as gas, water, telecommunication, electricity and banking
institutions to the private sector.3 It has looked to private corporations to
administer some prisons and encouraged private-sector universities
where none existed before. It has also looked to the private sector for
cleaning, security, and even research to assist in government
departments. Legislation has attempted to reduce red tape; to cut business
paperwork and administrative costs previously required by government
for infonnation, regulatory, and policy purposes. And attempts have been
made to increase the extent to which private sector corporate watchdogs
and corporations themselves administer and oversee company practices
concerning auditing, accounting, and financing; with some moderate
attempts by the state to reduce corruption, corporate excesses and
monopoly.
Secondly, as part of the neoliberal agenda, Australia has, especially since
the 1980s, attempted to deregulate the domestic financial system through
a series of institutional changes. Controls over interest rates on cheque
accounts, mortgages, and corporate and consumer loans were tenninated.
This was based on the belief that controls hurt those who can least gain
access to finance by reducing the overall availability of finance.
Monetary authorities also ceased to use variable reserve requirements to
control the money supply. Instead, open market operations (the buying
2 Attempts to reduce state spending in some cases have not been very effective.
Although neoliberalism seeks to reduce the size of government, certain critical
state expenses and lower economic growth tend often to maintain such spending
dUring long wave downswing. Neoliberalism in some cases may thus lead to
changes in the composition of state spending-from productive to less productive
activities. (See details later in this paper.) For some material on neoliberalism in
Australia, see, for instance, Winton Higgins (2006) and Philip Mendes (2003).
3 For instance, Lynne Chester (2007) has undertaken an empirical study showing
that the restructuring of the Australian electricity industry has resulted in high
prices for consumers and greater profits for business; with the vested interests of
industrial, financial and fictitious capitals gaining the most.
---------------- ------------------------------------------------
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and selling of mostly government securities) have become the established
way of controlling economic activity. Moreover, monetary policy
became the main discretionary means used by central banks/governments
to direct economic activity in the pursuit of stable prices (see Bakir 2004,
Mavroudeas and Papadatas 2008); fiscal policy has declined in relative
importance.
The third plank of Australia's institutional apparatus has been to
deregulate the labour market through reforming industrial relations.
Radical, liberal, and conservative economists all believed that during the
late 1960s and early to mid-1970s workers expanded their power relative
to capital; the wage share of national income rose to high levels; and
productivity declined markedly. The neoliberal response to this was to
try to increase the power of capital by de-instituting minimum wages,
expanding workplace agreements, including privacy clauses in union
voting, encouraging non-union and no-strike clauses in labour
agreements, and increasing the flexibility of wages and working
conditions. The main objective of these policies is to re-establish the
power, profitability and viability of individual corporations so as to
4
increase growth and accumulation.
The fourth plank of Australia's institutional environment has been tofree
up international capital so the global circuits of social capital can
expand. This was done by promoting the free movement of money,
production and trade worldwide. In the mid-1990s the World Trade
Organization was established to reduce tariffs and subsidies so that not
only products but also services could be traded more freely in the global
economy. The protection of intellectual property rights is slowly being
4 Conservative and radical economists had different responses to the perceived
in~rease in the power of labor over capital. Conservative or neoliberal economists
wanted to reduce the power oflabor, while radicals saw an opportunity to develop
an alternative economic policy based on democratic governance programs. For
instance, Bowles, Gordon & Weisskopf (1990:233) proposed policies to reduce
corporate waste, expand community knowledge and skills, and promote human
rights and democratic participation through the economy. As they say: "We are
committed to an economy that would offer sustainable improvements in living
standards, strong democracy and community at home and global cooperation
abroad, and more extensive economic fairness." For material on Australian
industrial relations deregulation see the special issue of the Journal ofAustralian
Political Economy Dec 2005 (e.g.• King and Stilwell 2005).
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enhanced by including China and the former Eastern Block in the system
of agreements. And some very minimal attempts were made to include
underdeveloped nations by putting agricultural reform on the agenda.
These multilateral agreements were designed to enhance free trade
regionally and globally. Several regional economic alliances were
formed as well, including the North American Free Trade Area, the
European Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the fledgling
Free Trade Area of the Americas. Unilateral changes have also assisted
in promoting free trade.
Just as critical to the neoliberal agenda has been the freer movement of
capital (especially in developed nations) through flexible exchange rates,
reducing capital controls, and more uniform taxation at lower rates
(especially for corporations and the rich). These changes let money
capital move more freely to those areas and activities with the highest
rate of return and where innovations could be implemented without
hindrance. The essence of capitalism is said to be inherent change,
dynamic innovation, and a world without barriers to doing business.
Only in a system free of restrictions to the movement of money capital
could investment - it is thought - enhance global profit and growth.
Reduced taxation and greater tax uniformity is consistent with this
enhanced free flow offoreign and domestic capital.5
A fifth plank of Australia's institutional environment concerns
international relations and global development. With the supposed
decline of US hegemony in the late 1960s and the 1970s, many believed
that global public goods could best be established by military policies
and foreign relations aimed at a new global system of power. The new
policy aims to re-establish US imperial power in the interests of global
corporations and finance capital. Hence, in the post-cold-war era, the
neo-conservatives in Washington and its allies sought to attack (at least
verbally, sometimes militarily) anti-US regimes in Iraq, Iran and North
Korea (the "axis of evil"), as well as (in practice) "terrorist" forces such
as the Taliban, al Qaida, and Hamas (via the Israeli military).
5 On the Australian connection for this international financial deregulation trend see
Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty (1999) and Heribert Dieter (2006).
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Renewed US power is thought to help establish a new pro-corporate
global system with stable property rights and greater security. Such a
system, to a considerable degree, transcends the United Nations, certain
global protocols (such as the Kyoto Agreement on climate change) and
the International Criminal Court, in favour of US power and authority.
Australia has been a part of this neoconservative alliance and the
"coalition of the willing" (see O'Hara 2004, Doran 2007).
The same neoliberal (and neoconservative) principles are imposed on
Africa, South and Central America, Central and Eastern Europe, the
Middle East and Asia. It is thought that development will only occur
where flexible markets and free trade are allowed to stimulate the
entrepreneurial spirit. No major stimulus is needed to promote
development except the freedom of private capital to emerge
spontaneously from an environment conducive to private initiative and
accumulation.
In short, for the sixth plank, the neoliberal development philosophy is no
different from neoliberal general philosophy. So, a uniform policy
framework is imposed on all nations, regardless of history, government
and culture. It is not necessary to understand each nation's experience, so
the argument goes, since "one size fits all". A system of individual and
corporate property rights is necessary to lay the groundwork for business
enterprise. A system of contract, accounting, and private rules and
guidelines provides the basis for a spirit of enterprise. Regulations on
business need to be dismantled for the bourgeoning business class to
emerge and become dominant.
These six planks form the basis of Australia's institutional environment
over recent decades. They have been responses to the deteriorating global
economic environment of the 1970s. Some challenges have emerged to
neoliberalism· (see O'Hara 2006: ch 10), but these neo-conservative
institutions are still dominant in Australia, and have been ongoing over
recent decades. The question is whether these policies have had a
positive impact on the economic performance of the Australian economy.
It is also critical to assess the potential of such policies to enhance
performance into the future.
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Long-Term Economic Performance and Contradictions
The institutional environment examined in the previous section is well in
place, in large measure; but this does not necessarily mean that a suitable
macro social structure of accumulation is operational. Indeed, the
institutional environment may be well in place without promoting long-
term accumulation and growth. (The question of an SSA for capitalist
development is independent of whether the institutional environment is
progressive in a socialist or communitarian sense.) To gain insight into
the degree that the institutions support long wave upswing (for capitalist
development) we examine in some detail the record of accumulation and
growth for Australia as part of the world-system, and then supplement
this with broader measures of long wave upswing.
Long wave theory is the philosophy that capitalism undergoes long
movements in core performance, including upswing and downswing,
beyond simply business cycles. For instance, during the 1950s, 1960s
and early 1970s, the core capitalist economies mostly underwent rapid
accumulation, as did the world economy as a whole. The United States
and Europe were at the core of this motion, while settler countries like
Australia and Canada tended to be consistent with much of the motion.
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia did not constitute the core
of this motion. The system of global Fordism provided a foundation for
twenty five years of rapid accumulation and growth, especially for most
of the advanced capitalist economies.
This accumulation regime, however, was seen to break down into the
1970s through to the early 2000s. During this period of global
neoliberalism, growth and accumulation faltered, especially in the core
capitalist economies, along with Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.
While the world economy as a whole underwent long wave downswing,
many parts of Asia reversed their trend and underwent long wave
upswing. Thus the core-periphery dynamics of global capitalism saw the
mature and most underdeveloped regions decline into the 1970s-2000s
while Asia underwent long wave upswing.
The question arises as to how Australia fits into this pattern. Did it follow
the advanced capitalist economies through upswing and downswing, or
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did its pattern deviate? Has Australia managed to undergo long wave
upswing into the 1990s and 2000s as it progresses along with the
emerging economies of Asia, to which it has strong economic ties of
trade, commerce and production? We tum now to the record, the need to
situate Australia within the framework of global patterns of growth and
accumulation. First, Table 1 shows the record for GDP per capita growth
on a world scale.6
Table 1: Real GDP Per Capita Growth: World and
Regions, 1950-2005, Period Annual Averages
Rel!lon 1950-73 1950-59 1961-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-05
World 2.93 3.20 3.38 2.08 1.27 1.24 1.73
Australia 2.34 1.89 3.44 1.43 1.93 2.15 1.78
East Asia Pacific n.a. n.a. 1.60 5.02 6.02 6.82 7.21
South Asia n.a. n.a. 1.81 0.61 3.42 3.32 4.33
USA 2.5 2.87 2.94 2.26 2.11 1.87 1.68
Western Europe 4.1 n.a. 5.37 3.17 2.02 1.67 1.24
SSA 2.02 n.a. 1.67 1.18 -0.76 -0.54 1.84
Latin America 2.67 n.a. 2.64 3.12 0.35 1.32 1.24
Middle East & NA 4.73 n.a 5.90 3.08 -0.72 2.00 1.96
Source: Adapted from O'Hara (2007c), Maddison (2007), Foster & Stewart (1991)
n.a. =not available
Long wave theory is based on the idea that economies undergo
evolutionary transformations through time, especially varying degrees of
durable growth. These patterns of long wave upswing and downswing
are not deterministic, but they do, nevertheless, seem to be fairly durable
through historical time.
A long wave upswing is defined as a long term pattern of high growth
(above 2.5 percent per capita), divided into 'low' wave upswing (2.51-
3.0) and 'high' upswing (above 3.0). Long wave downswing, on the
other hand, is where the pattern ofper capita growth is low, at or below
6 It is necessary to emphasise that we are examining the growth of real GOP growth
per capita throughout this paper, which gives a far beller indicator of growth than
simply real GOP growth. Per capita allows one to look at the proportionate real
growth per person. Many studies, especially those done by the IMF, tend to use
rates that are not per capita, which distorts the results. The World Bank, on the
other hand, does tend to use per capita estimates, which is to be condoned.
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2.0 percent over longish periods; there are varying intensities of
downswing from positive to negative growth. In between these upswings
and downswings are intervals of 'mixed results', between 2.01 and 2.5
percent growth, where there is potential transition toward downswing or
upswing. These are 'mixed results' since growth is not sufficient for
upswing and too high for downswing. Also, long waves are only defined
as such when at least 15 years of relatively consistent growth patterns are
evident; hence one decade of such growth can be classed only as a 'short
wave'.
Thus the following taxonomy is used in this paper:
Long Wave Phases: Growth of Real GDP Per Capita
Major Upswing: Greater than 3.0
Upswing: 2.51 and above
Mixed Result (Borderline): between 2.01 & 2.5
Downswing: 2.0 and less
Major Downswing: Less than 1.0
Long Wave UpswingIDownswing: consistent dynamics for at least 15
years
Short Wave UpswingIDownswing: consistent dynamics for at least 10
years
There are some surprising results here, especially for Australia. Two
stand out. The first is that Australia never underwent sustained long wave
upswing in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, the 1950s was a period of weak
per capita growth, while the 1960s was the only postwar decade of rapid
growth. This means that Australia underwent a (short-wave?) downswing
in the 1950s, and a short-wave upswing in the 1960s.
The second important result is that the whole period since the 1960s has
seen a sustained long wave downswing; except for a 'mixed result'
during the 1990s. This underlies the weakness of Australia's economic
performance for most of the period studied.
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Table 2: Long Wave Dynamics:
World and Regions, 1950-20057
Region Long Wave Short- 'Mixed Long Wave Short-
Upswing Wave Results' Downswing Wave
Upswing Downs
win2
World 19505-+605 19705 19805-+005
AU5traiia 19605 19905 19705-+805,20005 19505
Ea5t Asia! Pacific 19705-+005 19605
Sth A5ia 19805-+005 19605-+705
USA 19505-+605 19705-+805 19905-+005
Europe 19505-+705 19805-+005
SSA 19505 19605-+005
Latin America 19505-+705 19805-+005
MENA 19505-+705 19805-+005
Note: We have as5essed long waves by, among other things, taking into account the data in
Table I for 1950-1973 when data is missing for the 1950s.
The second is that Australia has not benefited as much as expected from
the East Asia long wave upswing. It seems that the 'booming' conditions
of parts of Australia have not trickled down to the country as a whole;
and that Australia's 'economic boom' has been exaggerated. For
instance, per capita real gross state income growth varies greatly during
2000-2007, from a massive annual average 6.25 percent for Western
Australia and a quite high rate of3.13 for New South Wales (very short
wave upswing); moderate rates of 2.48 for Queensland and 2.16 for
South Australia (mixed results); and very poor results of 1.43 for
Victoria and 0.46 for Tasmania (very short wave downswing) (ABS
2007b).8
7 Typically, despite these general conclusions of long wave downswing for all areas
except Asia, specific isolated nations do appear to be undergoing sustainable long-
term high per capita growth (long wave up5wing). These include, for instance,
Ireland with an average annual per capita growth of 5.2 percent (1975-2004) and
7.3 percent (1990-2004); Chile with 3.9 percent (1975-2004) and 3.7 percent
(1990-2004); Botswana with 5.7 percent (1975-2004) and 4.2 (1990-2004);
Mozambique with 2.6 percent (1975-2004) and 4.2 percent (1990-2004); and some
which barely made it above the "mixed result", such as Norway, with 2.6 percent
(1975-2004) and 2.5 (1990-2004). (UNDP 2006, pp. 331-334).
8 This reference to long wave motion for the states is purely short-hand language,
and does not mean to imply that long waves motion necessarily operates for the
states, as distinct from the national (or global) economy. The hypothesis of state-
-------------------
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Further details about the nature of Australia's economic performance
over recent decades are necessary. Next we investigate data on
investment and productivity as it compares with growth: see Table 3,
below:
Table 3: Investment, Productivity and Growth.
Australia, 1950s-2000s. Decade Annual Averages
Years Real Investment Labour RealGDP
Growth Rate Productivity*9 Growth
(private) Der caDi/a
1950-59 6.42** n.a. 1.89**
1960-69 7.43** 2.73 3.44
1970-79 2.38 2.21 1.43
1980-89 4.67 1.75 1.93
1990-99 3.99 2.72 2.15
2000-05 5.49 2.10 1.78
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2007), *PC (2007), ** Foster & Stewart (1991)
n.a. = not available.
The clear message of this table is that growth, investment and
productivity were all relatively high in the 1960s. However, this fell off
into the 1970s and continued through to the 1980s and 1990s. While
there has been a revival of productivity in the 1990s, and investment into
the 2000s, this has not significantly affected growth per capita, and
productivity diminished somewhat during the 2000s.
Now we examine Australia's performance for the (after-tax and after-
interest payments) rate of profit, along with its major determinants such
as the organic composition of capital and rate of surplus value
(exploitation), compared with growth per capita. The data is shown in
Table 4 on the following page:
wide long waves and SSAs, however, is an interesting one which has to date never
been explored.
9 The labor productivity year-categories are as follows: 1960s is for the period
1964/65-1973174; 1970s is for the period 1973174-1981-82; 1980s is for 1981/82-
1988/89, I990s is for 1988/89-1998/99, and 2000s is for the period 2000-2005 (PC
2007).
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Table 4: Profit Rate, Organic Composition, Surplus
Value and GDP Per Capita. Decade Annual Averages,
Australia, 1960-200610
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07
Rate of Profit [slc+v] x [100] 5.5% 3.3% 3.0% 4.0% 4.5%
Organic Composition of Capital
1.73 1.94 2.32 2.29 2.21[c/v]·
Rate of Surplus Value [slv]
15.0% 10.1% 10.1% 13.3% 13.6%x [100]
GDP Growth Per capita 3.44 1.43 1.93 2.15 1.78
Source: Adapted from Mason (2007:63).
Here the rate of profit is shown to be high in the 1960s but declining
significantly into the 1970s and 1980s. A modest recovery occurred in
the 1990s, with further improvement into the 2000s. But even these
increases have not re-established the profit rates of the 1960s. There were
profit rate declines into the 1970s and 1980s due to a lower rate of
exploitation and an increase in the organic composition of capital; due to
the relative inability to extract labour from workers and an increase in
depreciation and energy costs.
The modest increase in profit rate into the 1990s, and further
improvement in the 2000s, was due to a higher rate of exploitation (as
capital increased its power relative to labour) as well as reductions in the
cost of new technology (somewhat lower organic composition). These
changes occurred in tandem with the labour market being progressively
deregulated and greater competition stimulating new technology, but
with cost savings as the value of constant capital declined. These changes
have been positive for the interests of capital, but not manifestly
improving real growth per capita in any major way.
10 The rate of profit, which is surplus value (s) divided by constant and variable
capital (C+v), is calculated here after the payment of taxes and interest charges.
The organic composition of capital, which is constant divided by variable capital,
is a stock variable, while the rate of surplus value is surplus value divided by
variable capital. It is assumed, as is often done, that the variables are
approximated by money (i.e., national accounts) as all variables need to be realised
through exchange while becoming effective through the circuit of social capital. A
transformation procedure is thus not required.
---------~~-------------------
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Some of the institutional contradictions contributing to relatively poor
performance become obvious when GDP is disaggregated according its
principal components of investment, consumption, and net exports. Table
5 below shows that net exports have exerted a negative direct impact on
the Australian economy, as most decades have seen deficits in the trade
account.
Table 5: Total Investment, Consumption & Net Exports,
Percent ofGDP, Decade Annual Averages,
Australia, 1960s-2000s
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-06
LI/GDP 29.84 27.54 26.81 23.41 24.60
LC/GDP 71.11 72.38 76.00 77.31 76.59
LXn/GDP ~.12 0.028 -1.85 ~.785 -1.46
Stat Disc, dlnvent, etc ~.83 0.052 ~.96 0.065 0.27
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Adapted from ABS Cat. 5206.0 (2007a)
Such deficits have been common in the 1980s through to the 2000s. At a
narrow level, this illustrates that the inability of Australia to compete on
the world economy, and more especially its greater level of imports
compared with exports, has negatively impacted on growth. At a wider
level, the negative net exports demonstrate that a low level of world
income and excess competition have been adversely affecting most
nations, including Australia.
Another contradiction is the major drop in investment share of GDP-
including business, households and government investment-which has
inhibited the emergence of a viable regime of accumulation or SSA.
UNCTAD (2003:68), for instance, maintains that a nation generally
requires the investment share of GDP to be above 25 percent for regimes
of accumulation to begin to develop. Australia's total investment share
has dropped from around 30 percent during the 1960s short wave
upswing through to just under 25 percent in the 2000s. This shows that
the process of investment has been insufficiently building up assets that
provide a flow of services into the long term. Durable assets have been
deteriorating while investment has been insufficient to propel a new
wave of economic growth and accumulation.
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The vast maJonty of the aggregate demand has been spent on the
consumption of assets and the provision of services that provide no long-
term regime of accumulation. The accumulation instinct is insufficiently
developed, partly because Australia is not an active player in the global
production networks and commodity chains; and partly due to the low
state of world demand and excess competition. Table 6 provides
information to help assess further the sources of the problem.
Table 6: Government (GI) and Private
Investment (PI), Percent of GDP, Decade






Source: Adapted from ASS Cat 5206.0 (2007a)
In common with many other nations, Australia has been running down its
stock of public assets since the 1970s and 1980s. The public investment
share of GDP has declined quite dramatically from just less than 8
percent (1960s) to under 4 percent (2000s). This reflects the diminishing
priority given to government investment into electricity, gas,
communications, infrastructure, education and health over recent
decades. Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated the shift from
productive to unproductive government spending negatively impacting
on productive private investment. Productive government spending tends
to crowd-in private investment, while unproductive provision of transfer
payments for subsides and handouts crowd-out private investment. Thus,
Australia-along with the US, UK and others-has insufficiently built a
public regime of accumulation for long-term investment. I I
II There are dozens of interesting studies for numerous nations and areas on the
tendency for public capital to crowd-in private investment, while spending by
government on subsides and transfers tend to be unproductive in this sense. See
O'Hara (2006:chI0) for details of these studies. Studies for Australia tend to
support the conclusion that public capital crowds-in private investment, and that
the recent decline in public capital has reduced private investment by about half
the decline (see, for instance, Song 2002).
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The private investment share of GDP also fell considerably from the
1960s through to the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The private investment
share of GDP declined from over 22 percent of GDP through to over 18
percent of GDP. This very low level of private investment is
insufficiently building a regime of accumulation, due to low world
aggregate demand, unproductive government capital, insufficient
network ties to global business, and a shift in corporate objectives.
The last of these factors-shift in objectives-is linked to the change
from the 1960s when corporations tended to seek growth, through to the
latter emphasis on shareholder value. The shift from growth to share
market is a major change in the workings of the corporate economy,
which has resulted in a movement of funds from investment in
productive capital to the buying and selling of shares in the financial
system. In this, Australia has been following the lead of the USA and UK
in developing share market capital rather than productive capital (see
O'Hara 2006a:chs 2,3,8). This rise in fictitious capital has to some
degree diverted resources into relatively unproductive areas at the
expense of durable capital investment (contributing to a decline in
inflation). As a result, there has been an insufficient construction of a
private-sector regime of accumulation for long-term investment. (Some
significant increase in private investment share occurred in the early-mid
2000s, but this has yet to impact significantly on real GDP growth per
capita, and the trend may be transitory.)
Social and Environmental Performance
So far we have found that Australia does not have a well-established set
of instit].ltions for a durable and efficient macro social structure of
accumulation. The institutional contradictions are quite strong. Australia
seems to have joined the USA and most of Europe through a period of
maturation devoid of robust accumulation dynamics. Per capita growth
is relatively mediocre, as is investment, productivity and profit rate. Long
wave downswing commenced into the 1970s, and then continued, along
with some 'mixed results', through the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Some
evidence indicates a moderate rebounding of performance during the
~------_._-_._------- ---------------~
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1990s and 2000s and, while positive, it is not adequate at this stage for a
truly long wave upswing to emerge.
It is time to present further evidence of long wave motion from
'economic' to 'social and environmental' contradictions. Two pieces of
data are included here; the first relating to levels of trust in society; and
the second the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI).
Trust has been shown to be critical to the workings of the economy.
Trust is linked to social capital, the durable structures that provide mostly
non-market services to people, related to forms of reciprocity. It has been
linked to higher levels of investment, quality of life and social solidarity
(Ostrom and Ahn 2003). Neoliberal societies have tended to establish
relationships whereby trust has declined. This is because people are
working harder, and studying more, but having fewer community, family
and friendship associations beyond workplace and educational
institutions. The World Values Survey includes questions of 'trust' in
their social surveys, which have been ongoing over the past twenty five
years. Such data for Australia is shown below in Table 7:
Table 7: Levels of Trust in Australia, 1980, 1995
1980 1995 %Chanl!e
General Social Trust 47.8 39.9 -16.5%
Major Businesses 78.0 56.3 -27.8%
Justice System 60.1 34.4 -42.7%
Parliament 54.8 29.9 -45.4%
Source: Adapted from the EVSGIWVSA (2006), SSA (2007)
This evidence shows a considerable drop in levels of trust for the general
social fabric; significantly more deterioration in trust for business; and a
massive drop for the justice system and parliament. This drop in trust is a
major social problem, which has ramifications for the political economy
in terms of increases in transaction costs, fewer associative
communication efforts, and a decline in the quality of life. It indicates
that people are more likely to communicate along market lines, as well as
through more distant channels such as the internet. There has thus been a
switch of transactions from community, society, and family to market
linkages, corporate relationships and distant electronic forms. While this
---------~--_._-----
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enhances GDP, at least potentially, it also has negative effects on social
performance through reducing informal and more intimate linkages,
relationships and resources. 12
Another indicator relevant to long term trends in the social economy is
an assessment of the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). The GPI is an
alternative measure of performance useful to compare with GDP.
Included in the GPI is consumption, plus changes in voluntary labour,
social indicators, and environmental factors. Table 8 compares GPI with
GDP real growth per capita for three periods over 1986-2003:
Table 8: GDP and GPI, Growth Rate,
Per Capita, Australia, 1986-2003
Years GDPAnnual GPI Annual Average GPI minus GDP
Average Rate of Rate of Change Growth Rates
Chanl!e
1986-1990 +2.21% +1.85% -0.36
1990-2000 +2.11% +0.40% -1.71
2000-2003 +1.65% +1.26% -0.39
1986-2003 +2.05% +0.89% -1.16
Source: Adapted from Lawn & Clarke (2006: 120)
The poor GDP growth figures under-estimate the extent of long-wave
downswing and insufficient SSA development. During the late 1980s
real GDP growth per capita rose by an average rate of 2.21 %, while real
progress rose by only 1.85%; with GDP growth thus over-estimating
progress by 0.36 percentage points per annum. The 1990s saw average
annual GDP growth of 2.11 %, compared with real progress of only 0.40;
with GDP growth over-estimating progress by a massive 1.71 percentage
points per annum. The early 2000s saw GDP growth per annum rising by
2.05%, compared with real progress of 0.89%; with GDP over-estimating
progress by 1.16 percentage points on average each year. For the whole
period, 1986-2003, GDP growth per annum grew an average 2.05%,
compared with real progress of only 0.89%; with GDP growth over-
12 It is regrettable that Australian researchers were not included, or did not choose to
take part, in the 1999 and 2005 World Values Surveys; hence we have no date for
these years. Nevertheless, other sources indicate that the trend to lowers levels of
trust has continued.
-_..._-----------------------------------------------
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estimating progress by 1.16 percentage points (57%) on average per
annum.
These figures indicate that if material growth is reconstituted on the basis
of social and environmental indicators then the long wave conditions of
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s were far worse than earlier estimated. OPI is
worse than ODP due to declining social and environmental resources;
such as problematic distribution of income, air pollution, destruction of
ecological capital and the cost of underemployment (see Clarke and
Lawn 2007 for details).
If an 'economic' (ODP) long wave downswing or (at times) 'mixed
result', of a moderate degree, occurred during this (l980s-2000s) period
then 'social and environmental' (OPI) long wave downswing is more
marked. These further results illustrate that the underlying long wave
conditions are fundamentally contradictory-troublesome for ODP and
much more so OPI.
A longer-term analysis of ODP-OPI relationships typically shows that
both increased substantially during the long wave upswing of the 1960s,
but since then ODP growth has moderated, while OPI growth has
crashed, in some years being negative (Lawn and Clarke 2006). This
illustrates that the long wave downswing of the 1970s-2000s is more
problematic than indicated at first glance. This reinforces the message of
the theory of the disembedded economy and destructive creation that
what weak growth of the economy has been experienced has been at the
expense of social and ecological assets. This trade-off between durable
fixed capital (business capital) and social and ecological assets
(community capital) is less obvious for Australia than for the United
States and some other nations; but some degree of trade-off is
nonetheless operationaI.13
13 This is alluding to the vast literature on the multiple capital paradigm, including
durable fixed capital, human capital, social capital, ecological, plus others such as
body capital, familial capital, and so on. This paradigm is generating a revolution
in economics, and has the potential for being progressive in its social and political
implications. For instance, it shows that sometimes GOP per capita growth can be
positively related to social capital (eg. through SSAs), while in other scenarios the
two can be negatively related. An example of the latter is that business capital can
expand by subsuming/destroying social and ecological capitals. Indeed, this is
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Conclusion
This article has examined the question of social structures of
accumulation and long waves in Australia over past several decades. We
detailed the dominant institutions associated with the current functioning
of the Australian economy; and found the (neoliberal) institutional
structure to be well in place. However, a relatively durable institutional
apparatus does not necessarily translate into a viable macro regime of
accumulation or social structure of accumulation. This was found to be
very much the case, as the short run long wave upswing of the 1960s
evolved into the long wave downswing (or 'mixed result') of the 1970s-
2000s.
Much talk is made of a boom in the Australian economy into the 1990s
and 2000s. However, the evidence does not support a boom. A modest-
to-moderate recovery was noted for the 1990s and 2000s after-tax-and-
interest rate of profit, productivity, investment and rate of surplus value;
but this recovery has not translated into GDP growth per capita. Long
wave downswing is even more apparent when levels of trust and
'genuine progress' are scrutinised, due to social costs and environmental
destruction. Overall, long wave downswing is firmly in place in the
Australian political economy as the economic, social and environmental
contradictions are quite strong. There are, as shown, considerable
regional differences in this pattern from state to state; such as the huge
2000s growth in Western Australia, relatively strong growth in New
South Wales; moderate-medium growth in Queensland and South
Australia; and weak to very weak growth in Victoria and Tasmania.
It may well be that most Western economies underwent high rates of
growth in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s as a result of forces of an
historical nature that may not be re-emerging anytime soon (if ever).
Mostly they have fallen into industrial maturity, with a large service
sector, less volatility (perhaps) than in the 1970s and 1980s, but with low
growth per capita and a small investment share of GDP. The world is
turning towards Asia, especially China, as the region and many of its
what has been happening over the past few decades at least, in many nations of the
world. The Scandinavian nations seem to have a more progressive experience with
social and ecological assets. (See O'Hara 200 I on this multiple capital paradigm.)
-------------
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nations undergo massive industrialization and long wave upswing (see
O'Hara 2006b). The Asian boom does not necessarily have a major
impact on the wider region, in an environment of low world income per
capita, excess competition and periodic speculative bubbles.
This turn towards maturity and institutional sclerosis for Australia may
turn out to be positive from a social and environmental point of view. So
long as population growth is moderate there may be less urgency for
growth in already high GDP per capita level nations. Unemployment can
perhaps continue to be moderate as population growth declines; if
immigration moderates; and social and environmental objectives rise. We
may thus see a movement to a post-neoliberal system of governance as
we seek to eschew global warming and social fragmentation, and elect
more 'liberal' or social democratic administrations. In the process the
rise of new environmental technologies, energy sources, and social
initiatives may well provide a framework for a new long wave upswing,
of a progressive nature. Long waves of alternative industrial, social and
ecological capitals may be on the horizon if a progressive SSA is
successful in the future. This is the most upbeat possibility imaginable if
we are to explore optimistic futures. The other alternative may well be a
continuation of poorly growing traditional capitalist economy with few
successes of a business nature compared with those of the Asian nations.
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